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wo years after the first Greek rescue in May 
2010,  crisis  management  in  the  eurozone 
has still failed to restore confidence. A vivid 
picture of the situation can be found in Figure 1: 
the constellation of spreads on ten-year sovereign 
debts over the Bund in the eurozone is wider than 
it was before monetary union, as though financial 
markets  had  already  discounted  its  breakdown. 
Temporary  respites,  notably  in  the  early  part  of 
2012, have not interrupted the trend of increasing 
divergence that risks undermining the credibility 
of adjustment efforts under way. 
Doubts about the sustainability of sovereign debts 
have  been  fed  by  a  vicious  spiral  of  potential 
liabilities swelling sovereign debts from banking 
rescues.  Spreads  on  sovereign  borrowings  are 
widening  close  to  the  point  of  self-fulfilling 
dynamic instability. Investors from third countries 
have withdrawn in droves, private capital flows 
from the core to the periphery have dried up and 
banking  and  financial  markets  are  segmenting 
along  national  lines.  Much  of  the  burden  of 
financing payment imbalances and keeping credit 
channels open is falling on the ECB.  
Once  again,  the  European  Council  and  the  euro 
area  summit  met  in  an  emergency  session,  this 
time  at  the  end  of  June,  amid  acute  tensions  in 
financial  markets  and  the  eurozone  economy  in 
recession and actually plummeting in its southern 
periphery.  Their  deliberations  –  as  on  many 
previous occasions –represent progress towards a 
shared view of the crisis, and have outlined a set 
of  further  policies  that  serve  as  bricks  for  a 
stronger  house.  But  the  details  have  yet  to  be 
agreed  upon  and  the  usual  cacophony  of  post-
meeting  contradictory  statements  has  already 
dissipated some of its positive effects on market 
sentiment.  The  latest  timid  reduction  in  policy 
rates  by  the  ECB  appears  insufficient  to  ease 
strained liquidity and credit conditions and help 
the economy – and has been seen as confirmation 
that the ECB is acting under unduly tight political 
constraints.  
This paper reviews the causes of the ongoing crisis 
and  the  policies  needed  to  restore  stability  in 
financial  markets  and  reassure  a  bewildered 
public.  Its  main  message  is  that  we  will  not 
overcome  the  crisis  until  we  have  a 
comprehensive  and  convincing set  of  policies  in 
place;  able  to  address  simultaneously  budgetary 
discipline  and  the  sovereign  debt  crisis,  the 
banking crisis, adequate liquidity provision by the 
ECB and dismal growth.  
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1.  The unholy compromise 
From the start, it was clear that the eurozone did 
not  meet  the  fundamental  requirements  of  an 
optimal currency area since its factor and services 
markets were segmented along national lines and 
were  plagued  by  massive  rigidities.  But  it  was 
hoped  that  budgetary  discipline  and  economic 
convergence  would  tackle  this  problem. 
Furthermore,  the  fresh  drive  for  financial 
integration,  with  the  Lamfalussy  legislative 
initiatives and new regulatory architecture, would 
make it easier to absorb asymmetric shocks hitting 
the eurozone by means of compensatory private 
financing.  The  lack  of  a  supranational  fiscal 
transfer system, as exists in all (federal) monetary 
unions, was not seen as a paramount problem, as 
cyclical  stabilizers  in  national  budgets  were  left 
free to operate. 
What knocked the eurozone off course were the 
unintended  consequences  of  the  introduction  of 
the common currency on the perception of credit 
risk,  as  reflected  in  risk  premia  over  German 
lending  rates  when  they  fell  close  to  zero  and 
remained there until the first half of 2008 (Figure 
1).  Somehow,  financial  markets  decided  that  all 
sovereign and private credit risks were now the 
same in all the member states and levelled the cost 
of  financing,  regardless  of  underlying  cost  and 
productivity trends. It was as if monetary union 
entailed  an  implicit  joint  guarantee  that 
governments and banks would not be allowed to 
fail.  
The  impact  on  real  interest  rates  –  that  is,  the 
inflation-adjusted cost of borrowing – country by 
country  is  depicted  in  Figure  2.  From  the  late 
1990s  on,  real  interest  rates  already  increased 
further  in  Germany  than  in  other  eurozone 
economies  and  stayed  there  through  2007.  The 
effect was not simply laxer monetary conditions in 
countries  with  higher  (wage  and  price)  inflation 
and lower productivity growth, but an explosion 
of  lending  to  ‘periphery’  borrowers  by  ‘core’ 
country banks, notably German banks (Figure 3). 
Lax  credit  financed  housing  bubbles  in  Ireland 
and Spain and, to an extent, in France, and more 
broadly encouraged to postpone those structural 
reforms  that  were  required  for  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  monetary  union  in  divergent 
countries – including Italy, where market opening 
and productivity enhancing reforms stalled, after 
some progress in the 1990s.  
 
Excessive  debt  accumulation  by  the  private 
(financial  and  non-financial)  sector  and  housing 
price  bubbles  were  of  course  not  unique  to  the 
eurozone and were even stronger in the US and 
the UK, led by unruly monetary expansion by the 
Federal  Reserve,  until  the  collapse  of  Lehman 
Brothers precipitated a worldwide financial crisis. 
What  was  typical  of  the  eurozone  was  that  the 
credit  bubble  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the 
single  monetary  policy  and  was  financed 
recklessly by ‘core’ country banks.  
The other side of the coin – or, as in the title of this 
paper,  of  the  unholy  compromise  underpinning 
the functioning of the eurozone in its early years – 
was  massive  real  exchange  depreciation  in 
Germany vis-à-vis its eurozone partners (Figure 4) 
and the rest of the world, with enormous benefits 
for its exporting industry. Keeping the exchange 
rate  low  was  always  a  main  motivation  for 
Germany  to  seek  stable  exchange  rate 
arrangements and, later, monetary union with its 
European  partners.  Before  monetary  union, 
however,  the  Deutsche  mark  would  undergo 
periodic revaluations that would compensate for 
Germany’s  superior  productivity  performance. 
After  monetary  union,  there  was  no  such 
correction,  leading  to  a  massive  build-up  of 
competitive  and  payment  imbalances  within  the 
eurozone – underpinning a very rapid increase of 
German exports to its Union partners (Figure 5). 
Seen  in  this  light,  the  explosion  of  credit  from 
German banks to the ‘periphery’ of the eurozone 
was nothing other than the financial counterpart 
to the accumulation of massive trade and payment 
imbalances within the eurozone.  
If  we  turn  to  Figure  6,  we  see  that,  with  the 
notable exception of Greece, budgetary discipline 
was  on  the  whole  respected  up  until  2007,  with 
most  countries  reducing  their  budgetary  deficits 
and debt stock as a ratio to GDP (including Italy). 
True, in 2002-03 many countries exceeded the 3% 
deficit-to-GDP  limit  due  to  falling  economic 
activity,  but  excessive  deficits  were  later 
reabsorbed as economic activity picked up.  UNHOLY COMPROMISE IN THE EUROZONE AND HOW TO RIGHT IT | 3 
 
 
Figure 1. Eurozone bonds back to pre-euro levels 
(10-year government bonds interest rate, %)* 
 
* Monthly data. 
Source: ECB. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Real interest rates (%) 
 
 
*Data on Q1. 
Source: OECD.  
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Figure 3. Foreign claims of German banks on PIIGS  
(by nationality of reporting banks, $ bn) 
 
Source: BIS 2012. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Real effective exchange rates 
 (index, 1994=100) 
 
Source: Eurostat 2012. 
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Figure 5. German exports to the European Union (% of GDP, 1999=100) 
 
Source: Eurostat 2012. 
 
Figure 6. General government debt and balance, 2001, 2007 and 2010 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012. 
 
On  that  occasion,  however,  ill-conceived  policy 
responses by the European Commission and the 
Council did permanent damage to the credibility 
of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact.  Indeed,  the 
attempt  to  enforce  the  3%  deficit  limit  on  many 
member  states  simultaneously  during  cyclically 
depressed  economic  conditions  backfired,  once 
France  and  Germany  refused  to  comply  (in 
November 2003).  
Only after the financial crisis, the need to avoid an 
economic  and  financial  meltdown  compelled 
governments  to  step  in  to  support  aggregate 
demand and make private liabilities whole, in face 
of rapid deleveraging by banks, households and 
corporations.  The  increase  in  the  public  sector 
deficit was larger in countries where the private 
sector had leveraged more: Spain, but also the UK, 
Ireland, and the US. Italy was more prudent, and 
as a consequence suffered a steeper fall in output. 
Thus it was, in sum, that excessive private debt 
was turned into unsustainable public debt and, as 
a  consequence  of  economic  imbalances  that  had 
been  accumulated  during  the  decade,  the 
eurozone  has  become  a  straitjacket:  where 
budgetary  policies  are  tightened,  growth  falters 
and periphery countries must engineer substantial 
real  exchange  rate  devaluations  to  regain 
competitiveness  and  reabsorb  their  external 
deficits.  And  ‘core’  countries  consider  there  is 
little they can do to strengthen aggregate demand 
and relieve pressure on their partners.   
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Table 1. GDP growth, 2012 (%) 
  European 
Commission   OECD   IMF   Latest  
France   0.5   0.6   0.5   -0.1  
Germany   0.7   1.2  0.6   -0.1  
Greece   -4.7   -5.3   -4.7   -5.7  
Ireland   0.5   0.6   0.5   0.4  
Italy   -1.4   -1.7   -1.9   -2.4  
Netherlands   -0.9   -0.6   -0.5   -0.7  
Portugal   -3.3   -3.2   -3.3   -3.5  
Spain   -1.8   -1.6   -1.8   -2.2  
Eurozone   -0.3   -0.1   -0.3   -1.0  
UK   0.5   0.5   0.8   -0.2  
Source: European Commission, 2012 Spring Forecast; OECD 
Economic  Outlook,  June  2012;  IMF  WEO,  April 
2012; author’s own estimates. 
With  this  constellation  of  policies,  tightening 
financial  constraints  have  already  resulted  in  a 
large  reduction  in  aggregate  demand  in  the 
periphery – which is also dragging the core down 
into  recession,  due  to  their  large  exposure  to 
peripheral markets for their exports. And indeed, 
recent data point to a rapidly worsening economic 
environment also in Germany (Table 1), where the 
trade  balance  has  shrunk  dramatically  in  recent 
months.   
2.  Design flaws  
A  rapid  and  large  increase  of  government  debt 
has  been  a  generalised  phenomenon  in  the 
industrially advanced world following the 2007-09 
crisis: for the first time, the average debt-to-GDP 
ratio for OECD countries has exceeded 100%; it is 
over 200% in Japan and 120% in Italy, but many 
other  countries,  including  the  US,  have  passed 
100%  and  several  yet  the  90%  mark.  Budgetary 
consolidation will weigh on growth prospects for 
two generations to come, and the welfare state as 
we have known it in Europe since World War II 
will have to be transformed, also in response to 
the rapidly ageing population.  
The  eurozone  debt  crisis  has  features  that  set  it 
apart  however:  while  the  average  debt-to-GDP 
ratio  is  no  higher  than  that  in  other  advanced 
countries, and consolidation efforts started earlier 
resulting  in  a  much  lower  deficit-to-GDP  ratio 
(Figure 7), in the past two years the eurozone has 
been mired in a severe crisis of confidence.  
Figure 7. General government debt and deficit, 
2011 and 2016 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012. 
This points to a systemic dimension of the crisis 
that cannot be reduced to profligate behaviour by 
budgetary  sinners,  but  also  has  its  roots  in  the 
flawed  institutions  of  monetary  union  itself.1  In 
sum, three main flaws have been made evident by 
developments  since  the  Greek  financial  crisis 
started: 
i.  The  system  lacked  effective  arrangements  to 
counter  divergent  budgetary  and  more 
broadly  economic  policies;  as  long  as 
enforcement  of  budgetary  discipline  is 
entrusted  to  an  intergovernmental  body,  the 
problem is bound to come back, limiting the 
credibility of common budgetary rules. 
ii.  Financial  markets  have  underpriced  private 
and sovereign credit risks, in the implicit belief 
that  no  one  would  fail  and  all  debts  would 
somehow  be  made  whole,  entailing  weak 
market discipline on borrowers.  
                                                   
1 P. De Grauwe, “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone”, 
CEPS Working Document No. 346, CEPS,  May 2011. 
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iii.  Once the crisis hit, leading to a re-pricing of 
risks  in  financial  markets,  the  disconnection 
between  monetary  (centralised)  and  fiscal 
(decentralised) powers has created a vacuum 
de  facto  impeding  full  use  of  monetary 
instruments to absorb monetary and financial 
shocks, and leaving individual members of the 
eurozone  exposed  to  intolerable  pressure  by 
financial markets.  
Over the past two years, fundamental changes in 
economic  governance  have  tried  to  rectify  these 
flaws,  in  the  main  by  strengthening  budgetary 
rules and more broadly economic governance. The 
Fiscal  Compact  and  the  Six Pack  and  Two  Pack 
legislative  measures  represent  important 
achievements that should place economic policies 
in  the  eurozone  and  the  entire  Union  on  more 
solid foundations.  
It should not escape our attention that a process 
that started out as ‘intergovernmental’ has turned 
‘communitarian’  along  the  way.  Key  powers  of 
scrutiny and proposal over the implementation of 
common  policy  guidelines,  under  Article  121  of 
the  TFEU,  have  been  entrusted  to  the  European 
Commission, and the Council itself has limited its 
own  ability  to  reject  Commission 
recommendations: the latter are accepted unless a 
qualified majority agrees to change them. It is an 
important development that allows unanimity in 
the Council in decisions about common economic 
policies to be overcome as we move towards fiscal 
union.  It  will  be  useful  to  manage  the  further 
inevitable centralization of budgetary decisions. 
Strong economic governance rules, however, will 
not suffice. History shows that a fully functioning 
monetary union also requires a central bank that is 
free  to  act  as  required  to  confront  liquidity  and 
confidence  shocks;  and  some  mutualisation  of 
government  debts,  together  with  centralised 
control  over  public  spending  and  taxation. 
Moreover,  it  must  have  centralised  banking 
supervisory  policies,  with  strong  powers  to 
manage bank crises and resolve the banks when 
they cannot be rescued: an essential ingredient to 
protect the eurozone against reckless lending and 
risk-taking by banks.  
All  this  can  only  be  achieved  gradually,  as  we 
move  towards  a  fully-fledged  federal  union,  as 
Ms. Merkel is right to point out (and Mr. Hollande 
would be wise to heed, with full understanding of 
the  implied  surrender  of  sovereignty).  Whether 
the eurozone will survive in the meantime will be 
determined  by  the  capacity  of  the  European 
Council  to  set  up  intermediate  arrangements 
capable  of  halting  the  crisis  and  restoring  trust 
among its members.  
In their latest meeting at the end of June, for the 
first  time  European  leaders  have  acknowledged 
the multiple dimension of the crisis, accepting that 
austerity  –  putting  everyone’s  house  in  order  – 
will  not  suffice.  Accordingly,  new  joint  policy 
initiatives  will  address  the  growth  problem, 
banking  union  and  the  liquidity  dimension. 
Moreover, a report on the future of the economic 
and monetary union, prepared by President van 
Rompuy in cooperation with the presidents of the 
European  Commission,  the  Eurogroup  and  the 
ECB,  has  placed  these  new  policies  within  a 
longer  term  framework  and  coherent  vision, 
which may also include “the issuance of common 
debt” (p. 5). 
3.  The manifold dimension of eurozone 
stabilisation 
Let us now review the main decisions taken by the 
European Council and the euro area summit at the 
end  of  June  and  the  way  they  address  the 
eurozone fault lines.  
a)  The growth compact 
The  European  Council  has  agreed  on  a  new 
“Compact  for  growth  and  jobs”  that,  while 
reaffirming the necessity for the member states to 
continue  their  budgetary  consolidation  and 
economic  reforms,  identifies  a  specific  European 
dimension of growth policies that includes: 
i.  Stepping  up  implementation  of  the  internal 
market  in  energy,  transport  and 
communications (notably broadband) 2 and the 
                                                   
2  An  influential  strand  of  thought  maintains  that 
infrastructure investment does not improve productivity, 
mainly based on the US experience of strong growth with 
poor  road  and  rail  networks  and  dismal  public  utility 
services. The European variant has it that Europe already 
has  all  the  infrastructure  that  it  needs  and  that  further 
investment  would  be  wasted.  This  view  seems 
unconvincing.  For  instance,  recent  research  on  a  large 
sample of countries reported in VoxEU (“Fiscal spending 
and growth: More patterns” by C. Carrière and J. de Melo, 
17  May  2012)  finds  that  a  shift  in  discretionary 
expenditures  towards  transport  and  communications 
“was only observed for fiscal events followed by growth 
events”.  In  many  EU  countries,  including  Italy  and 8 | STEFANO MICOSSI 
 
services Directive. The member states will be 
held  accountable  for  their  actions  and 
inactions  on  this  score  under  the  new 
European  Semester  procedure,  based  on  a 
Commission report. 
ii.  With  a  view  to  boosting  financing  of  the 
economy,  all  available  funds  at  Community 
level  will  be  mobilised  in  support  of 
infrastructure  investment  for  the  internal 
market.  Although  the  numbers  are  not  large 
relative to the eurozone economy (about 1%), 
they are not inconsequential; furthermore, by 
removing physical obstacles to the functioning 
of the internal market, these investments may 
bear  larger  fruits  in  terms  of  efficiency  and 
cost reduction.    
What is notably missing is the recognition of the 
need  for  greater  flexibility  in  budgetary 
consolidation efforts. There are two aspects to this 
issue. First, as the Commission had requested in 
its Communication “Action for Stability, Growth 
and  Jobs”,3  countries  with  stronger  budgetary 
positions  should  consider  slowing  their 
consolidation efforts in order not to aggravate the 
recession.  Secondly,  in  order  to  preserve  the 
confidence  of  investors,  a  number  of  eurozone 
countries must strike a difficult balance between 
budgetary  austerity  and  the  need  to  avoid  an 
economic overkill that would frustrate budgetary 
consolidation.4 This difficult balancing act would 
have been facilitated by a clear statement by the 
European  Council  confirming  that  letting 
automatic  stabilisers  work,  while  remaining  on 
track  with  ‘structural’  budgetary  targets,  fully 
complies with EU obligations.5 The good news is 
                                                                                       
Germany,  over  the  past  decade  public  investment  has 
been low, sometimes below what was needed solely for 
depreciation and maintenance. Moreover, the creation of a 
functioning market for gas and electricity and for digital 
services requires large, and surely profitable, investment 
to establish the connections between segmented national 
markets  –  investment  that  was  held  back  by  national 
monopolists and that is a source not only of higher prices 
and lost productivity gains, but in the case of gas also of a 
dangerous  concentration  of  supply  with  a  politically 
unreliable partner such as Russia.  
3 COM(2012) 299 of 30.5.2012, final. 
4  C.  Cottarelli,  “The  austerity  debate:  Festina  lente!”, 
VoxEU, 20 April 2012. 
5  The  prime  minister  of  Italy,  Mario  Monti,  has  also 
proposed  to  exclude  certain  public  investments  of 
‘European  added value’  from  the  balanced  budget  rule. 
The proposal should not be too difficult to accept to the 
that the Council is not unaware of the problem, as 
clearly shown by the Eurogroup decision, on July 
9,  to  give  Spain  one  more  year  to  achieve 
budgetary balance.  
Moreover,  a  greater  share  of  the  adjustment 
burden  must  fall  on  Germany.  The  relatively 
generous  wage  agreements  recent  reached  in 
Germany will help, but they are not enough: there 
is also a need to step up domestic demand. More 
aggressive  liberalisation  of  the  bloated  banking 
system, network services, especially in energy and 
transport,  and  public  procurement  may  provide 
over  time  a  significant  contribution  to  raising 
domestic  investment  and  income.  The  sizeable 
investments required to make up for the loss of 
nuclear  energy  may  contribute  more  immediate 
stimulus.  All  this  should  not  be  seen  as  a 
concession, but must be recognised as part of the 
obligations undertaken by eurozone governments 
with the new procedure for excessive imbalances, 
although  so  far  the  Commission  has  somewhat 
shirked  its  responsibility  to  apply  it  even-
handedly.6  Germany  should  be  convinced  that 
without its own contribution in reviving growth 
and correcting external payment imbalances, the 
eurozone  will  not  escape  prolonged  depression 
and will be doomed.  
b)  Bank rescues  
As cross-border interbank flows between creditor 
and  debtor  countries  have  shrunk  to  a  trickle, 
there  has  been  a  growing  concentration  of 
sovereign  debt  with  national  banks  in  crisis 
countries  –  facilitated  by  carry  trade  operations 
undertaken  by  banks  with  ECB  LTRO  funds  to 
repair  their  damaged  balance  sheets.  As  a 
consequence,  most  private  holdings  of  Greek 
public  debt  are  now  concentrated  with  Greek 
banks, and more than half of public debt in Spain 
is held by Spanish banks.  
                                                                                       
extent that the return on those investments is sufficient to 
cover interest costs and the repayment of principal. If, on 
the  other  hand,  an  element  of  subsidy  is  required,  this 
should be included in current spending and the budgetary 
balance.  The  Commission  could  be  asked  to  ascertain 
whether these conditions are met and clear the exceptions 
to the balanced budget rule.  
6 Report from the Commission, “Alert Mechanism Report. 
Report prepared in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Regulation  on  the  prevention  and  correction  of  macro-
economic imbalances”, COM(2012) 68 final of 14.2.2012. UNHOLY COMPROMISE IN THE EUROZONE AND HOW TO RIGHT IT | 9 
 
The vicious spiral between the sovereign debt and 
banking  crises  has  been  compounded  by  the 
decision,  first  taken  in  Europe  by  Ireland,  and 
later  followed  in  Spain’s  Bankia  crisis,  to  make 
good  all  banks’  private  creditors  and  shift  the 
burden of rescues onto the public budget. Fears of 
a  repeat  of  the  post-Lehman  disaster  have  been 
one reason; another has been pressure by creditor 
countries to spare their banks from any losses on 
their exposure. Thus, as the sovereign debt crisis 
has deepened, banks’ ratings are lowered; as the 
banks face the prospect of growing losses on their 
government  securities,  financial  markets  raise 
estimates of potential losses and attendant capital 
injections,  which  are  immediately  computed  as 
larger government debt. 
The  Eurogroup  statement  on  Spain’s  request  for 
financial  assistance  for  its  banks  of  June 9th  had 
made  this  dangerous  interconnection  an  official 
policy:  “The  Eurogroup  considers  that  the Fund 
for Orderly Bank restructuring (FROB), acting as 
an agent of the Spanish government, could receive 
the  funds  and  channel  them  to  the  financial 
institutions  concerned.  The  Spanish  government 
will retain the full responsibility for the financial 
assistance and will sign the MoU.” 
The  European  Council  has  now  rectified  this 
mistake  and  has  decided  that  the  EFSF/ESM 
funds  will  be  used  to  inject  funds  directly  into 
Bankia and other ailing Spanish banks, subject to a 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  with 
appropriate  conditionality  –  but  has  made  this 
possibility  subject  to  the  establishment  of  “an 
effective  single  supervisory  mechanism  ... 
involving the ECB”. It has also decided that these 
loans will not enjoy seniority status so as not to 
avoid  undesirable  repercussions  for  other 
outstanding  debt.  The  final  approval  of  the 
support  measures  by the  Eurogroup  is  expected 
by July 20th and disbursement of the funds should 
endue shortly thereafter; the Spanish government 
will be liable for the capital injection until the new 
mechanism for centralised bank supervision is in 
place.  
On this, two observations are in order. Firstly, in 
designing  its  centralised  supervision  system  for 
cross-border  banks,  the  Union  should  adopt  an 
FDIC-type  prompt  corrective  action  system,  in 
which supervisors will be bound by an obligation 
to  act  when  bank  capital  falls  below  certain 
thresholds, in full public light. This is essential in 
order  to  overcome  supervisory  forbearance,  i.e. 
the tendency for supervisors to conspire with their 
regulated entities in delaying loss recognition and 
corrective action.  
Secondly,  when  banks  lose  money,  their 
shareholders  and  creditors  should  cover  them 
before any deployment of taxpayers’ money. The 
timing of loss recognition is essential in order to 
reconcile creditors’ participation in the losses with 
the  need  to  avoid  further  destabilization  of 
financial markets in the present juncture. To this 
end, when the EFSF/ESM step in with their funds, 
they  should  initially  receive  (non-voting) 
preferred  shares  of  the  bank,  entailing  minimal 
cost  (the  EFSF  borrowing  cost  plus  a  fee), 
redeemable  within  a  reasonable  time  span,  say 
three  years.  During  this  period,  shareholders 
should be given a chance to restore the bank to 
health, if need be with new management, and pay 
back  the  EFSF/ESM  what  they  were  given. 
However, should they fail to redeem them, those 
shares should become full voting shares and the 
EFSF/ESM  should  take  over  the  bank  to 
restructure  it  and,  if  need  be,  resolve  it. At  that 
time,  not  only  shareholders,  but  also 
subordinated,  and  even  senior  unsecured 
creditors  of  the  banks  should  be  called  to 
contribute,  perhaps  as  has  been  suggested  with 
forced conversion of debt into equity.7    
c)  Stabilizing interest rates spread 
As mentioned, a major source of financial tensions 
in  the  eurozone  has  been  the  constraints  on  the 
possibility  of  using  its  currency  for  financial 
market  stabilization.  These  constraints  mainly 
reflect the absence of a centralised fiscal power – a 
eurozone  Treasury  –  able  to  provide  ultimate 
backing to the ECB for its banking and sovereign 
debt  stabilization  operations.  Of  course,  when 
push comes to shove, the ECB has little choice but 
to intervene as required to stop contagion and the 
melt-down of sovereign and banking markets.  
In this context, a most controversial decision taken 
by  the  euro  area  summit  concerns  the 
commitment  “to  ensure  the  financial  stability  of 
the Eurozone, in particular by using the existing 
EFSF/ESM instruments in a flexible and efficient 
manner in order to stabilize markets for Member 
States  respecting  their  country  specific 
recommendations  and  their  other  commitments 
                                                   
7  See J.R.  Rallo,  “A  Better  Way  to  Save  Spain’s  Banks”, 
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...”. The interventions will be undertaken by the 
ECB, acting as an agent of the EFSF/ESM.  
On this, please note that the Council had already 
decided to let the ESM undertake sovereign debt 
purchases or swaps in the secondary markets, as 
required  by  the  effective  implementation  of  its 
assistance programmes. The little extra step now 
has  been  to  contemplate  explicitly  market 
interventions  to  stabilize  interest  rate  spreads  in 
countries  that  are  forcefully  addressing  their 
domestic  imbalances.  The  ensuing public  debate 
seems  to  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  these 
market interventions would in no way represent 
additional  finance  for  the  beneficiary  countries, 
since  they  would  take  place  in  the  secondary 
markets.  They  would  not  be  dissimilar  from 
quantitative  easing  interventions  undertaken  by 
the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England 
to  lower  long-term  interest  rates  in  depressed 
economic conditions.   
What  may  seem  awkward  is  the  decision  to 
entrust these interventions to a government fund, 
rather  than  the  ECB  itself.  It  would  have  been 
more  straightforward  to  encourage  the  ECB  to 
resume  its  securities  purchase  programme  – 
which  it  had  abandoned  at  least  in  part  due  to 
relentless  opposition  by  some  members  in  its 
Governing  Council  –  while  earmarking 
EFSF/ESM  funds  to  effectively  insure  the  ECB 
against  any  losses  stemming  from  such  market 
operations.  Entrusting  the  EFSF/ESM  has  the 
additional drawback that the funds available for 
intervention  are  limited,  which  inevitably 
weakens  the  deterrent  effects  on  sovereign 
eurozone paper short-sellers.  
We  turn  now  to  discussing  why  this  action  to 
lower interest rate spreads within the eurozone is 
necessary. 
4.  Managing the debt overhang 
As  already  mentioned,  few  would  disagree  that 
fiscal  union  will  eventually  entail  some 
mutualization of sovereign debts. However, action 
on this front may be needed soon, for two reasons. 
There  is  an  issue  of  economic  sustainability  of 
adjustment:  the  increase  in  interest  rates  risks 
frustrating  ongoing  efforts  at  budgetary 
consolidation  and  indeed  pushing  indebted 
countries beyond the point of dynamic instability. 
It should not be overlooked, in this regard, that – 
should  Spain  or  Italy  lose  market  access  –  the 
attendant costs for Germany would climb steeply 
both if it decided to rescue them or if the euro was 
let go and the eurozone broke up.  
And  there  is  an  issue  of  political  sustainability: 
political  support  for  painful  and  protracted 
adjustment  programmes  cannot  survive  without 
stronger  signs  that  sacrifices  will  bear  fruit  – 
which  cannot  happen  unless  the sovereign  risks 
are somewhat shared.  
A cursory look at Figure 8 confirms that the issue 
of debt sustainability is a serious one. According 
to  IMF  estimates,  under  current  growth  and 
interest  rate  scenarios,  by  2016  the  debt-to-GDP 
ratios  of  most  eurozone  countries  will  basically 
not diminish or only do so marginally, and as a 
result  the  average  debt-to-GDP  ratio  for  the 
eurozone will actually increase.  
Figure 8. Public debt in selected countries, 2011 and 2016 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012. 
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The main exception is Germany, where the ratio 
will decline below 80% – but nonetheless remain 
well above 60% (some decline is also observed for 
Greece,  but  this  is  of  course  the  result  of  debt 
restructuring). This is the most difficult issue since 
German  taxpayers  must  be  convinced  that  they 
are not asked to make good the debts incurred by 
others.  The  good  news  is  that  a  proposal  that 
meets  this  requirement  exists,  namely  the 
proposal  for  debt  redemption  put  forth  by  the 
German Council of Economic Experts.1  
The  idea  is  fairly  simple:  all  sovereign  debt  in 
excess of the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio of eurozone 
member  states,  excluding  those  already  under 
financial  assistance,  would  be  placed  in  a 
redemption  fund  (over  a  transitional  ‘roll-in’ 
period  of  3-4  years),  in  exchange  for  jointly 
guaranteed 25-year debentures issued by the fund 
in  financial  markets,  with  an  immediate 
substantial  interest  rate  relief  for  more  indebted 
countries.  Each  country  participating  in  the 
scheme  would  continue  to service  its  own  debt, 
pro-quota,  until  full  redemption.  To  this  end,  it 
would  have  to  segregate  for  the  redemption 
payments  a  specific  revenue  source  from  its 
national  budget,  under  appropriate  irrevocable 
arrangements. After 25 years, all the debt would 
be paid out and all countries would have debt-to-
GDP ratios at or below the 60% target. 
Table  2  throws  some  further  light  on  the  issue. 
The  left-hand  columns  report  current  and 
structural  primary  balances  –  i.e.  total 
expenditures  minus  revenues  and  interest 
payments – in 2011 of selected eurozone members, 
and  in  the  centre  column  the  primary  balances 
implicit  in  budgetary  targets  agreed  by  each 
country under the excessive deficit or broad policy 
guidelines  procedure  (3rd  column  from  the  left). 
The  table  also  reports  the  longer-term  estimates 
prepared  by  the  OECD  of  primary  balances 
required to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to 50% by 
2050 (4th column). The latter estimate is interesting 
since it incorporates long-term pressures deriving 
                                                   
1  German  Council  of  Economic  Experts,  “Euro  Area  in 
crisis”,  Annual  Report  2011/12,  Third  Chapter, 
Wiesbaden,  November  2011.  See  also  P.  Bofinger,  L.P. 
Feld, W. Franz, C.M. Schmidt and B. Weder di Mauro, “A 
European Redemption Pact”, VoxEU, 9 November 2011; 
and H. Doluca, A. Hübner, D. Rumpf, B. Weigert, “The 
European  Redemption  Pact:  An  Illustrative  Guide”, 
German  Council  of  Economic  Experts,  Working  Paper 
02/2012, February 2012.  
from pensions, health and long-term care. As may 
be  seen,  on  this  score,  Italy  looks  better  than 
France,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  mainly 
thanks to its pension reform.  
The table highlights that indeed strenuous efforts 
will  be  required  over  decades  to  maintain 
acceptable  budgetary  balances:  clearly,  what  is 
asked from Greece and Spain (and Ireland?) may 
not  be  realistically  achievable,  pointing  to  the 
need  of  relaxing  existing  commitments  (as  the 
Ecofin has indeed decided to do for Spain at its 
July 9th meeting). The European Redemption Pact 
(ERP)  would  make  these  efforts  manageable  by 
reducing  the  interest  rate  costs:  the  savings  are 
substantial  and  may  indeed  make  the  whole 
difference  between  (economic  and  political) 
sustainability and un-sustainability.  
Under the ERP, Germany would shoulder some of 
the risks of sovereign debt in the periphery – and 
pay an interest premium for this – but would be 
fairly  secure  that  it  will  not  have  to  repay  debt 
incurred by others. The redemption fund would 
be a temporary device. Capital markets would in 
all likelihood like the debentures to be issued by 
the fund, leading to the creation of a liquid and 
deep market for eurozone paper. Over time, with 
progress  towards  federal  union,  these  securities 
could  be  substituted  by  jointly  issued  Union 
bonds  of  the  federation  –  without  any  need  for 
anyone to take over the accumulated obligations 
of others. 
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Table 2. Budgetary consolidation requirements (% of GDP) 
 
* Source: European Commission, “Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and stability 
programme”  for  Member  States,  30  May  2012.  For  Greece,  European  Commission,  “The  Second 
Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece”, March 2012. 
** Increase in the underlying primary balance needed to bring gross financial liabilities to 50% of GDP 
in  2050.  Source:  OECD,  "Fiscal  Consolidation: how  much, how  fast  and  by  what means",  OECD 
Economic Policy Paper No. 1/2012, April. 
*** Source: German Council of Economic Experts, “The European Redemption Pact: An Illustrative 
Guide”, Working Paper No. 2, 2012. 
5.  Conclusions 
Over  the  past  two  years,  we  have  managed 
collectively to transform the debt crisis of a small, 
almost marginal member of the eurozone into an 
existential crisis of our common currency. This has 
happened because the Greek crisis has brought to 
full  light  serious  fault  lines  in  the  economic 
governance  of  the  eurozone.  Subsequently,  we 
have made substantial progress in mending these 
faults,  but  disagreements  and  policy 
inconsistencies along the way have offered ample 
opportunities  to  speculators  to  attack  our 
sovereign  debt  markets,  massively  raising  the 
adjustment costs.  
 
Financial market pressures will not subside until 
we  can  reach  a  solid  consensus  on  a  policy 
framework  capable  of  reconciling  austerity  with 
growth,  dealing  with  the  debt  overhang,  and 
ensuring  that  the  ECB  can  provide  adequate 
liquidity support without endangering its balance 
sheet  and  independence.  The  good  news  is  that 
the European Council and euro area summit have 
finally come to recognize all these ingredients as 
essential to stabilize financial markets and restore 
the eurozone economy to good health. If only our 
leaders  could  stop  quarrelling  in  public  like 
cantankerous old men (and one lady) even when 
they basically agree on what needs to be done, the 
situation would improve much more rapidly.   
actual  structural to meet agreed  
budgetary target
(change 2011-2015*)
to stabilize the 
current debt ratio
by 2050 (OECD**) 
under the 
ERP*** 
Germany 1,6 1,8 0,9 4,8 2,0
France -2,6 -1,6 4,3 5,4 2,4
Italy 1,0 1,3 4,7 2,6 4,2
Spain -6,1 -4,9 8,1 4,2 2,5
Netherlands -2,6 -1,4 1,6 6,3 1,5
Belgium -0,4 -0,1 3,8 6,0 2,9
Ireland -9,7 -4,9 12,5 8,6 -
Portugal -0,4 -6,2 4,1 3,0 -
Greece -2,4 - 6,9 3,3 -
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